RE: Elephant in the Room Solution Considerations
MHTamdgidi_(Behrooz) > 22-12-2025, 08:14 PM
I apologize in advance for a second “wall” of text. My choices are either to do it this way, or split it into more sections (each of which runs the risk of being misunderstood as being a part of a whole section/notion). I have chosen the former to avoid the latter, and those wishing to read it in parts, can still do so. You can just treat these as “short” essays, rather than brief posts.
Just to begin with, I wish to elaborate more on and explain the logical procedure I will use to share what I can about the Voynich Manuscript (VM). So, I include in this post just a few more matters of method.
I find it helpful to apply to my study of the VM what we call in sociology the “phenomenological” approach. Even though that term crosses disciplinary boundaries for good reasons, in sociology we use it to refer to a procedure whereby we study something inductively, in each step always questioning not just what we are studying, but also our own notions of it that we have taken for granted. So, in each step, we ask, even regarding obvious terms or notions, “what do you mean by that?”
Being inductive also, as you know, involves a procedure of going from surface appearances to deeper layers of the inquiry, as if peeling an onion step by step, in contrast to starting with preconceived notions of what the object of our study may be.
This is very important in sociological phenomenology, since the object is not just “out there,” but also “in here” and how the two relate. And this of course has significant sociological implications as well, especially regarding the VM study.
An “enigma” is not just about what is out there, or what we believe about it, but a relation between the two. What may appear to be enigmatic to us now, was likely not only not enigmatic to the ones who produced or created the artifact, but perhaps not even to those living in their times (for now I will use a plural for “ones” and “them” not to bias the procedure, implying it could be one or more people behind the VM’s creation).
So, when we say something is enigmatic, we need to always problematize what we take for granted, always asking, “enigmatic for whom?” also needing to ask, “enigmatic when?” and “enigmatic where?” Also, we can and need to also ask “is it really enigmatic” and “does it serve anyone’s interest to keep an inquiry enigmatic, consciously or not, even when it can be reliably demonstrated that the object under study was not, is not, or is no more, enigmatic?”
The inductive procedure also allows us to remain as much as possible on reliable and verifiable grounds as we peel the onion, since if we were deductive, we could have tons of wild or tame ideas or theories to start from. I am here mindful of ReneZ’s good point about the challenge of keeping a balance between what he calls “solutions space” and the inevitable narrowing down that takes place when we begin to take concrete steps in favor of specific theories or solutions.
I think the inductive method is much more scientific to do in the case of the VM, than one starting, for example, with statistical studies whose objects are not even yet established (do they represent letters, words, numbers, illustrations, procedures, etc.?).
To follow the method as proposed above, I’d like to present it in the fruitful way Omar Khayyam (1021-1123 AD) shared it in one of his treatises as I have studied in detail in my other works.
He was basically suggesting a similar procedure, one that was indeed both phenomenological and sociological, when studying something. First, he said, we ask, whether it exists (or, does it exist)? Then we follow by asking, what is it? And then ask, why is it?
In sharing this approach, he made a distinction between objects out there, and objects that exist in our own minds, or broadly subjectively.
If it is out there, we can begin with the first question, he said, but if the object is a creation of our own minds (such as a metaphor, for which he used the notion of the Phoenix) we need to reconsider the steps in favor of asking the second question first, since we cannot really know what the object is and stands for, if we have not yet defined it, or don’t know how someone defines it, say, in a poem.
If it is a mythical bird having this or that attribute, which may even be (and has been) culturally variant, we may say it does not exist as such, besides its existing in our minds, but if it stands for, poetically, a person, we could technically answer by saying he or she does not exist as a living person, though his or her memory may still exist in our minds.
There is a subtlety about the distinction made about objective and subjective realities, which I will not enter here yet, but Khayyam was very mindful of it and in fact wrote other treatises about it in his own condensed way. It has to do with the notion of a subjective reality existing objectively as well.
For example, we do not even know who, say, his neighbor, was when he lived. But we know Khayyam and have a memory of him perhaps more widely than many others, a thousand years past his time. And even this memory is socially constructed and who he was and what he wrote can depend on whom you ask.
The above point may even apply, and do so significantly, to the VM as an artifact to which certain memories and meanings may be associated that are trying to be passed on live on. But I will get back to this later in this study, if it is found to be needed and helpful.
The point here is that objective and subjective realities do not have to be treated in a dualistic way, as billiard balls, and must also be regarded as parts of a whole reality.
In any case, as far as the VM is concerned, I think the original procedure applies. First, because we are studying an object that does exist out there and needs to be studied. Second, in this case, we don’t even reliably know (yet) what it means substantively. So, I think we can regard the process of the usual inquiry (whether, what, why) as being still valid.
Still, a final methodological point is important also to keep in mind.
If we end up peeling the onion to its core from its whether, to its what, and to its why, we have only done half of the job of knowing what it is about. We have learned its essential core, but still, we need to return from its core to its whole, including also knowing its “how,” that is, how the onion was, is, and can be, put together, and that process usually implies learning it historically, in time and place, and understanding more how we have gone about knowing it.
This second reverse procedure implies being deductive, going from essence to appearance, so to speak—but we will now be deducing not from thin air, but based on the findings of the inductive stage preceding it. So, even Khayyam’s steps need to be understood as applying to the process of inquiry rather than also of presentation.
The inquiry-presentation procedure has been also referred to as the logical-historical method, so let us keep all the above in mind as we now go about studying the VM more substantively.
Does the VM exist? What is it? Why is it? How did it (and our efforts in knowing it, or not) come about historically?